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CAN UNIVERSITIES REGULATE HATE-SPEECH AFTER DOE v.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN?
Racism, sexism, homophobia, and anti-semitism are on the rise on uni-
versity and college campuses,1 leaving university officials to struggle with
appropriate institutional responses to these acts of prejudice.2 One com-
mon response has been for universities to promulgate policies prohibiting
discriminatory speech-so called "hate-speech" regulations.3 Students
have challenged the policies on first amendment grounds.4
University officials are properly concerned with the increase of dis-
criminatory behavior and speech by students. They are responsible for
ensuring equal educational opportunity, preventing interference with the
educational process, protecting students from harm, both physical and
psychological, and maintaining order on campus.' Hate-speech restricts
1. France, Hate Goes to College, 76 A.B.A. J. 44 (describing incidents at the University of
Michigan, the University of Wisconsin, and Stanford University); Hodulik, Prohibiting Discrimina-
tory Harassment by Regulating Student Speech. A Balancing of First Amendment and University
Interests, 16 J.C.U.L. 573 (1990) (describing incidents on the University of Wisconsin campuses);
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320,
2333 n.71 (1989) (citing incidents at over 20 universities and colleges); Metz, BadApples, Evil Deeds:
How Law Students Deface Free Speech, 1 STUDENT LAW, Feb. 1990, at 33; Smolla, Rethinking First
Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 176-78
(1990) (citing a report documenting racist incidents at 250 colleges and universities since 1986, a
report documenting 38 incidents of anti-semitic harassment in 1988, and individual stories).
The increase in racist incidents is not limited to university campuses. Such incidents are occurring
with increased frequency in the workplace and in neighborhoods. See Matsuda, supra, at 2327-28.
2. Metz, supra note 1, at 33.
3. Koepke, The University of California Hate Speech Policy: A Good Heart in Ill-Fitting Garb,
12 HASTINGS COMMENT L.J. 599 n.2 (1990) (stating that at least 20 colleges and universities have
adopted or are considering policies regulating student speech).
Some commentators have suggested an alternative method to curb hate speech that is not strictly
limited to the university context: the filing of a tort claim. See, eg., Love, Discriminatory Speech
and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 123 (1990).
4. Students have challenged the University of Michigan policy, see Doe v. University of Mich-
igan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); the University of Wisconsin policy, see UMW Post v.
University of Wisconsin, No. 90-C-328 (D. Wisc. filed March 29, 1990); the University of Connecti-
cut policy, see Wu v. University of Connecticut, No. H89-649 (D. Conn. consent decree filed Jan. 25,
1990). Students also sued faculty at SUNY-Buffalo. Metz, supra note 1, at 37.
5. Hodulik, supra note 1, at 576-79. The author notes that the duty of universities to promote
racial harmony arises, in part, from federal caselaw and statutes, including: Brown v. Board of
Eduction, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964);
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972); and § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). Hodulik, supra note 1, at 576-77. See also Note, A First
Amendment Justification for Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 733,
770-71 (1989-90).
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target groups' and individual's full access to the university environment.6
Such behavior disrupts the academic environment and interferes with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.7 University offi-
cials have found that anti-discrimination policies are effective tools in
curbing prejudice and bias.'
A federal district court's decision in Doe v. University of Michigan,9
and other first amendment challenges to university anti-discrimination
policies, however, cast doubt on whether universities have the power to
regulate hate-speech in any meaningful way. In Doe, the district court
struck down the University's policy on discrimination and harassment as
overly broad and impermissibly vague"° under the first amendment.11
The court found that the policy regulated speech that fell outside the
narrow categories of unprotected speech.2
The Supreme Court's interpretation of what speech merits absolute
constitutional protection, partial protection, and no protection has
evolved, leaving a somewhat confused first amendment doctrine.1 3 In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,14 the Court recognized only two levels of
speech: speech that the first amendment protects absolutely, and speech
6. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2372. The author believes that "official tolerance of racist speech
in [the university] setting is more harmful than generalized tolerance in the community-at-large."
Id. at 2371. Greater harm results from the power imbalance between university officials and depen-
dent students, the lack of tenured minority faculty members resulting in the marginalization of mi-
nority students, and the fact that students are a captive audience. Id. at 2371-73.
7. Id. at 2370-73; Hodulik, supra note 1, at 579.
8. College Rules to Curb Bias Draws Challenge on Constitutional Basis, Wall St. J., Sept. 4,
1990, at B4 (citing statement by University of Wisconsin employee).
9. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
10. See infra note 29 and accompanying text for further discussion.
11. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866-67. For further discussion of the Doe case, see infra notes 24-41
and accompanying text.
12. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863. The court cited several Supreme Court cases carving out the
narrow exceptions to protected speech. See Bethel School Dist. No. 103 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1986) (libel and slander); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (vulgar and shocking speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words"). Doe,
721 F. Supp. at 863.
13. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18 (2d ed. 1988), for a
discussion of the evolution of first amendment doctrine. See also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2349
(describing first amendment doctrine as "notably confused").
14. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court
upheld the criminal conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who uttered "fighting words" to a city mar-
shall in the midst of a disturbance caused by a crowd's hostile reaction to the appellant's proselytiz-
ing on the street. Id. at 573.
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that the first amendment does not protect;15 only narrowly drawn catego-
ries of speech are not constitutionally protected, including "fighting
words," which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of peace. 1 6
While the "fighting words" doctrine remains good law, 7 the Court has
begun to shift away from Chaplinsky's simplistic methodology. Instead,
the Court has moved towards an analysis that recognizes that some
forms of speech merit partial protection. 8 These new categories of
speech include near-obscene speech, 9 offensive speech,20 and defama-
tion.21 The "bedrock" principle of first amendment doctrine, however,
has remained intact: societal objection to a particular message does not
justify speech restrictions.2" Opponents of hate-speech regulations often
rely on the prohibition against content-based restrictions in challenging
the regulations' constitutionality.23
In Doe v. University of Michigan ,24 the district court held that the Uni-
versity of Michigan's anti-discrimination policy violated the first amend-
15. The Chaplinsky approach became known as the two-level theory of first amendment doc-
trine. L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 929. Professor Kalven receives the credit for first applying the
term "two-level theory" to the Court's analysis. See Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
16. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. The Court cited other categories of speech that do not
receive first amendment protection: "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous." Id. at 572.
The Court noted the widespread acceptance that such utterances have little social value. Id.
17. See Smolla, supra note 1, at 198 ("fighting words" doctrine is the "one kernel of Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire that still survives").
18. See L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 930 (stating "the Court is beginning to construct a multi-
level edifice with several intermediate categories of less-than-complete constitutional protection").
19. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (Court upheld
under the first amendment a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from
locating within a thousand feet of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church,
park or school).
20. See, eg., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (Court
upheld under the first amendment the Federal Communications Commission's determination that
the language of a monologue broadcast was indecent and prohibited by statute).
21. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (rule of law applied by the
state court failed to provide the speech those safeguards required in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct).
22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Justice Brennan stated: "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
23. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2351 (author, who supports some restrictions on hate-speech,
notes that the strongest argument against such regulation is that it is content-based, and, thus, forces
government into the business of counseling). See also Metz, supra note 1, at 34-35.
24. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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ment.25 In response to an increasing number of on-campus racial
incidents,26 the University adopted a policy regulating the discriminatory
harassment of students.27 The policy prohibited, under the penalty of
sanctions, "[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victim-
izes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual ori-
entation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or
Vietnam-era veteran status ... 28 To merit punishment, the student's
behavior had to involve a threat29 or have the purpose or "reasonable
foreseeable effect" 3 of interfering with another student's education, em-
ployment, extra-curricular activities, or personal safety.31
The district court deemed the policy overbroad, both on its face and as
applied.32  The court first distinguished pure speech from mere con-
25. Id. at 866-67.
26. Id. at 854. The incidents included a flier calling for "open season" on African-Americans,
referring to these citizens as "saucer lips, porch monkeys, and jigaboos;" a campus radio station
broadcast of racist jokes; and a display of a Ku Klux Klan robe in a dormitory window. Id.
For a description of the history of the policy, see Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854-56.
27. Id. at 856. The policy applied to "[e]ducational and academic centers, such as classroom
buildings, libraries, research laboratories, recreation and study centers. . ." Id. (quoting from the
policy).
28. Id. To resolve complaints, the policy provided informal mediation and resolution mecha-
nisms, and a formal hearing process whenever the parties could not reach a negotiated settlement.
Id. at 857.
29. Id. The policy defined a punishable threat as one that "[i]nvolves an express or implied
threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-
curricular activities or personal safety." Id.
30. Id. The policy prohibited behavior that "[has the purpose or reasonable foreseeable effect
of interfering with an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University spon-
sored extra-curricular activities or personal safety." Id.
31. Id. The policy included a provision prohibiting:
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct that stigma-
tizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or sexual orientation where such behav-
ior:
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment,
participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety;
b. Has the purpose or reasonable foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's
academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activ-
ities or personal safety;
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits,
employment or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities.
Id. The penalties for violating the policy ranged from a formal reprimand to expulsion. Id. at 857.
Penalties also included community service, class attendance, restitution, eviction from University
housing, suspension from specific courses and activities, and suspension from school. Id.
32. Id. at 866. The University maintained that it had never applied the policy to protected
speech. Id. at 861. The University of Michigan antidiscrimination policy included a provision ad-
dressing free speech protection, which stated: "The Office of the General Counsel will rule on any
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/16
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duct.33 The court then noted that the first amendment did not prohibit
state regulation of the most extreme forms of discriminatory conduct,3 4
which the University was free to proscribe.3 5
In contrast, the court stated that the first amendment placed strict lim-
itations on the University's power to regulate "pure-speech. '3 6 Accord-
ing to the court, the first amendment prohibited the University from
regulating speech based upon content,37 unless it fell within limited cate-
gories of unprotected speech. 8
Comparing the scope of the University's policy with the categories of
unprotected speech, the court concluded that the policy was overbroad,
sweeping "within its ambit a substantial amount of protected speech
along with that which it may legitimately regulate.' 39 Additionally, the
court held that the policy was impermissibly vague.' The court believed
that the terms "stigmatize," "victimize," "threat," and "interfere with"
eluded precise definition.4"
Students have challenged the anti-discrimination policies of other uni-
claim that conduct which is the subject of a formal hearing is constitutionally protected by the first
amendment." Id. at 856-857.
33. Id. at 861. The court noted that it is sometimes difficult to draw a precise line between
conduct and speech. Id. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that conduct may be "sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). For a discussion of the difficulties in-
volved in distinguishing speech and conduct for first amendment purposes, see L. TRIE, supra note
13, § 12-7.
34. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 861. The court listed discrimination in the allocation of employment
and government benefits, discrimination in education, conspiracies to deprive persons of their consti-
tutional rights, abduction, sexual harassment, rape, assault and battery, and vandalism as extreme
forms of discriminatory conduct. Id. at 861-62. The court added, however, that a variety of crimi-
nal law and the threat of civil suits sanction such forms of discrimination. Id. at 861.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 863. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of
the content-based prohibition in first amendment analysis.
38. Id. The court listed fighting words, obscenity, some vulgar and shocking speech, types of
libel and slander as unprotected speech. Id. See supra note 12. The court acknowledged that,
under certain circumstances, racial epithets, slurs, and insults might fall within the "fighting words"
category, and be subject to university regulation. Id. at 862.
39. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864. The court stated that a permissible scope of application does not
insulate a statute from constitutional scrutiny. Id.
40. Id. at 867.
41. See supra notes 30-31 for the policy. For a critical view of the Doe decision, see generally
Recent Cases, First Amendment-Racist and Sexist Expression on Campus-Court Strikes Down
University Limits on Hate Speech-Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989), 103 HARv. L. REv. 1397 (1990). For the view that Supreme Court precedents support the
Doe decision, see Smolla, supra note 1, at 208.
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versities as unconstitutional restrictions of speech.42 In October of 1990,
a group of students at the University of Wisconsin filed suit against the
University, challenging its anti-hate speech policy on first amendment
grounds.43 Wisconsin's policy prohibited "racist or discriminatory com-
ments, epithets or other expressive behavior" and physical conduct that
intentionally demeaned the race or sex of the individual or created an
intimidating or hostile educational environment.' Relying heavily on
the Doe decision, the students argued that the policy was similarly over-
broad and impermissibly vague.45 The case is still pending.
The University of Connecticut adopted an anti-discrimination policy
in 1989, which prohibited students from "making personal slurs or epi-
thets based upon race, sex, ethnic origin, disability, religion or sexual
orientation.46 The university amended its policy after a student filed suit
in federal court, challenging the policy on first amendment grounds.47
The amended policy is now limited to "the face to face use of 'fighting
words' by students to harass any person(s) on university property or on
other property to which the Student Conduct Code applies."'48
After Doe, only a narrowly drawn policy will survive first amendment
42. See supra note 4.
43. UMW Post v. University of Wisconsin, No. 90-C-328 (D. Wisc. filed March 29, 1990). The
University of Wisconsin code is "one of the toughest" university anti-hate speech codes. See France,
supra note 1, at 44.
44. Complaint at Exhibit A, UMW Post v. University of Wisconsin, No. 90-C-328 (D. Wisc.
filed March 29, 1990). For a discussion of the history of the policy, see Hodulik, supra note 1, at
574-75. Penalties provided by the policy include written reprimand, probation, suspension, and ex-
pulsion. Brief for Plaintiff at 8 n.2., UMW Post v. University of Wisconsin, No. 90-C-328 (D. Wisc.
filed March 29, 1990). One incident giving rise to the policy involved a fraternity party featuring a
"Harlem Room" with students in black-face and cardboard caricatures of black men. Id. at 574.
45. Brief for Plaintiff at 11-14, 17, 20, 25, 32, 43-44, UMW Post v. University of Wisconsin,
No. 90-C-328 (D. Wisc. filed March 29, 1990). For the view that the Wisconsin policy survives
constitutional scrutiny, see generally Hodulik, supra note 1.
46. Hodulik, supra note 1, at 36-37.
47. Wu v. University of Connecticut, No. H89-649 (D. Conn. filed Jan. 25, 1990). To amend
the policy, the parties entered into a court-approved consent decree. Proposed Consent Decree, Wu
v. University of Connecticut, No. H89-649 (D. Conn. filed Jan. 25, 1990).
48. Id. The policy defines "fighting words" as:
those personally abusive epithets which, when directly addressed to any ordinary person
are, in the context used and as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to pro-
voke an immediate violent reaction, whether or not they actually do so. Such words in-
clude, but are not limited to, those terms widely recognized to be derogatory references to
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, and other personal
characteristics.
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scrutiny.4 9 Courts following Doe will invalidate university anti-discrimi-
nation policies that are not limited to the narrow exceptions carved out
of the prohibition against content-based regulation. Thus, the Doe deci-
sion leaves university officials very little room in which to maneuver.
University officials properly may restrict discriminatory conduct, 50 but
very few racial and sexual harassment incidents involve pure conduct. 51
To further restrict student behavior requires courts to "continue to
stretch existing first amendment exceptions."52
An anti-discrimination policy limited to "fighting words," similar to
the University of Connecticut's amended rule,53 most likely will survive
constitutional scrutiny under Doe. 54 This exception "edge[s] close to the
category of racist speech,"55 but generally fails to reach most of the dis-
criminatory speech on university campuses.56 Courts have interpreted
the "fighting words" exception narrowly to reach only speech that
presents a "clear and present danger" of violent reaction.57  The fre-
quency of racist and sexist comments, however, cuts against viewing
hate-speech as posing such an imminent danger.58 Furthermore, because
49. The Doe court noted the strong first amendment prohibition against content-based restric-
tions. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 962-63 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Several commentators have argued that anti-discrimination policies can withstand constitutional
attack only if courts depart from traditional first amendment analysis. Moreover, these same schol-
ars believe such departures are necessary to prevent first amendment concerns from undermining or
sacrificing equal protection. See generally, Matsuda, supra note 1; Smolla, supra note 1.
50. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's test for distinguishing conduct
from speech.
52. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357. The author states that extending the existing categories of
unprotected or partially protected speech will weaken first amendment doctrine; she therefore advo-
cates treating racist speech as sui generis. Id.
Note that discriminatory harassment by students does not fall neatly into the defamation excep-
tion because such harassment does not necessarily lower the victims' reputations in the community.
Smolla, supra note 1, at 210.
53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Smolla, supra note 1, at 199.
55. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2355. Proponents of racist and sexist speech prohibitions often
rely upon the "fighting words" doctrine, at least in part, to justify restrictions on hate-speech. See
Metz, supra note 1, at 35.
56. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2355. See also Smolla, supra note 1, at 199. A least one com-
mentator believes that something broader than the "fighting words" policy will survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. Id. at 210-11. The author admits, however, that universities will have difficulty
drafting a policy that will survive constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 211.
57. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 929; Brief for Plaintiff at 22, UMW Post v. University of Wis-
consin, No. 90-C-328 (D. Wise. filed March 29, 1990) (stating that since Chaplinsky, the Supreme
Court has not upheld a single conviction for the use of fighting words).
58. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2355.
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most victims internalize the messages rather than lash out against the
perpetrators, it is difficult to categorize hate-speech as "fighting
words."5 9
The Doe decision and other court challenges may force university offi-
cials to devise and implement other means to curb ethnic, racial, sexual,
and homosexual harassment. Stripped of the power to regulate hate-
speech in any meaningful way, universities must focus on eliminating the
root causes of discrimination.' A number of options are available. Sev-
eral universities now require students to enroll in classes that explore
racial issues.61 Orientation sessions highlighting racial and cultural di-
versity sensitize students to the various forms of discrimination and set a
tone of tolerance in the academic environment. 2 Additionally, increased
efforts to recruit women and minority faculty members and students are
potent weapons against discriminatory speech. In the absence of these
or similar remedial measures, targeted groups and individuals, as well as
nonperpetrating students, will be forced to tolerate racist and sexist
speech.
Carol W. Napier
59. Id.
60. Opponents of hate-speech regulation believe that the most effective way of creating a har-
monious school environment is to provide support services and programs, not by limiting speech.
Metz, supra note 1, at 36. Proponents of hate-speech regulation would argue that services and
programs are not enough to combat racism. See Matsuda, supra note 1.
61. Brief for Plaintiff at 39, UMW Post v. University of Wisconsin, NO. 90-C-328 (D. Wisc.
filed March 29, 1990).
62. Id. (citing UW-Madison as an example).
63. Students across the country boycotted classes in 1989 in an effort to force law schools to
hire more minority faculty. A Boalt Hall student organization, The Coalition for a Diversified
Faculty, spearheaded the movement. See Metz, supra note 1, at 38. Furthermore, the University of
Wisconsin at Madison adopted a diversification plan that includes a hiring goal of seventy minority
faculty members by 1991 and calls for doubling the number of minority students by 1990. Brief for
Plaintiff at 39, UMW Post v. University of Wisconsin, No. 90-C-328 (D. Wisc. filed March 29,
1990).
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